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EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF 
COMPUTER PROOF 
 
Drew Van Denover 
 
Abstract     Some mathematical theorems can be proven only with 
the help of computer programs. Does this reliance on computers 
introduce empirics into math, and thereby change the nature of 
proof? I argue no. We must distinguish between the warrant the 
proof gives for its conclusion, and our knowledge of that warrant. 
A proof is a priori if and only if the conclusion follows deductively 
from the premises without empirical justification. I start by 
defending this definition, and proceed to demonstrate that 
computer-generated proofs meet its criterion.  
 
For more than one hundred years, mathematicians tried and 
failed to produce a valid mathematical proof of the ―Four Color 
Theorem‖, or 4TC. First proposed in 1852, the 4TC conjecture 
remained unproven until Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken 
published their solution in 1976. Debate immediately erupted 
about the legitimacy of their methods. Unlike every previous 
proof, Appel and Haken‘s work made ineliminable use of a 
computer program. Their knowledge of the 4TC depended on the 
operations of a physical machine—apparently introducing 
empirical elements into mathematics, the purest a priori science. 
Thomas Tymoczko soon emerged as a chief critic of the possibility 
of a ―computer-assisted proof.‖ These CAPs, he alleged, 
incorporate contingent facts about the world, whereas 
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mathematical proofs require a priori certainty. On his account, we 
should reject the 4TC as a true ―theorem‖ lest we fundamentally 
alter the nature of mathematical truth. He writes: 
 
[The] use of computers, as in the 4CT, 
introduces empirical experiments into 
mathematics. Whether or not we choose to 
regard the 4CT as proved, we must admit that 
the current proof is no traditional proof, no a 
priori deduction of a statement from premises 
…. I will suggest that, if we accept the 4CT as a 
theorem, we are committed to changing the 
sense of ―theorem‖, or, more to the point, to 
changing the sense of the underlying concept of 
―proof.‖1 
 
I disagree with Tymoczko; CAPs can be a priori in the requisite 
sense. Something is a priori if it has a non-empirical justification—
regardless of whether humans have a priori knowledge of that 
justification. We must distinguish between the warrant the proof 
gives for its conclusion and our knowledge of that warrant. I 
contend CAPs provide excellent, a posteriori reasons for thinking 
that Appel‘s proof has an a priori justification.  
Most of the debate turns on what we mean by ―a priori 
proof.‖ I begin by discussing competing definitions, and then offer 
an account of how computer-generated proofs satisfy the best one. 
I conclude that we need not choose between CAPs‘ legitimacy and 
the aprioricity of mathematics. 
 
                                                 
1
 Tymoczko, Thomas. 1979. "The Four-Color Problem and Its Philosophical 
Significance". The Journal of Philosophy. 76 (2): 58 
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Assumptions 
I want to make explicit some of the background 
assumptions underlying my thesis. First, I assume that normal 
mathematical reasoning, such as we find in ordinary human-
produced proofs, counts as a priori. Following Frege, this is not to 
say that we discover arithmetic truths without reference to sense 
experience, but rather that their ultimate justification makes no use 
of it. Contemporary philosophers of mathematics seem largely to 
accept this thesis, and anyone denying it would see no epistemic 
difference between computer-derived proofs and the more natural 
kind. For the purposes of this paper, we shall therefore bracket 
objections to the aprioricity of mathematics in general. 
 Second, we need to outline our general conception of 
―proof.‖ I agree with Rota that a mathematical proof is 
fundamentally an argument—a ―sequence of steps which leads to 
the desired conclusion.‖2 Like any other argument, proofs proceed 
from a set of premises to a conclusion, which we call a 
mathematical theorem. I see at least two necessary conditions for 
proof-hood (although more may exist). An argument is a 
mathematical proof only if (1) the argument is deductively valid 
and (2) it is in some sense a priori. These are distinct criteria. 
Heuristic arguments are increasingly common in the field, and 
indeed they can provide legitimate a priori mathematical 
knowledge—however, ―The proposition was true for all of the 106 
cases we tested‖ does not amount to a proof of that proposition. 
Observe that Goldbach‘s Conjecture, for all its inductive support, 
                                                 
2 Rota, Gian Carlo. 1997. "The Phenomenology of Mathematical Proof". 
Synthese. 111 (2): 183 
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has yet to achieve the status of ―theorem.‖ Similarly, many 
arguments deductively entail their conclusions, but because their 
premises are fundamentally empirical claims, they do not enjoy a 
priori status. Tymoczko‘s argument denies the second condition 
that CAPs are a priori, but we will seek to reaffirm it. 
 
Defining “A Priori Proof” 
We must clarify what we mean by ―a priori.‖ In this section 
I reject the definition Tymoczko uses, which requires proofs 
necessarily to generate a priori knowledge. Instead, I offer my own 
definition which does not refer to any particular individual‘s 
knowledge at all. 
Recall that aprioricity is an epistemological concept. It 
primarily concerns knowledge—that is, justified true beliefs.3 
Specifically, it concerns the ―justified‖ part of knowledge. A given 
belief is a priori when its justification does not depend on sense 
experience. I agree with Kripke that, strictly speaking, the 
predicate ―… is a priori‖ applies to knowledge and belief 
exclusively, for they are the only bearers of justification.
4
 We know 
something a priori when we know it on the basis of strictly non-
empirical evidence.  
 As such, calling a proof ―a priori‖ involves a little sleight of 
hand. Proofs are neither beliefs nor knowledge. They are 
arguments—abstract mathematical constructions consisting of a set 
of premises, a conclusion, and the inferential relations between 
them. An argument is a proof whether or not any particular person 
                                                 
3
 Where the justification and the belief are related in the right way, of course.  
4
 Kripke, Saul A. 1980. Naming and Necessity. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press.), 35 
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knows it is a proof, and whether or not anyone believes it is a 
proof. We need to stipulate what ―a priori‖ means when applied to 
mathematical arguments.  
 Before presenting my own definition, I want to discuss 
what I take to be the received definition of ―a priori proof‖: 
 
(1) An argument is an ―a priori proof‖ if and only if it is 
capable of providing a priori knowledge of its conclusion to 
people with sufficient mathematical ability and knowledge 
of the involved concepts. 
 
Intuitively, I find this view highly plausible. As mathematical 
apriorists by assumption, we think that all mathematical truth can 
be known without sense experience. Naturally, proofs should 
provide exactly that knowledge. This definition paints the 
following picture: When a mathematician reads the proof of a 
theorem, he mentally internalizes each proceeding step. He holds 
the entire proof in his mind, and can see why it is true. Because he 
knows the workings of the proof, he believes the theorem it 
underpins. If asked, he can rely on his understanding alone to 
justify that belief without recourse to experiential propositions. His 
knowledge of the theorem is completely a priori.  
 On definition (1), CAPs are not a priori because they are 
not surveyable. Since no one mathematician can read the proof in 
its entirety, no one person can truly know it. Appel presumably 
understands the concepts involved in his proof of 4CT, but when 
he justifies the results step by step, he must refer to empirical work 
done by computers. For this reason, Tymoczko denies that CAPs 
are truly ―proofs‖—they cannot actually provide a priori 
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knowledge: 
 
The mathematician surveys the proof in its 
entirety, and thereby comes to know the 
conclusion …. The proof relates the 
mathematical known to the mathematical 
knower, and the surveyability of the proof 
enables it to be comprehended by the pure 
power of the intellect—surveyed by the mind‘s 
eye, as it were. Because of surveyability, 
mathematical theorems are credited by some 
philosophers with a kind of certainty 
unobtainable in the other sciences. 
Mathematical theorems are known a priori.
5
 
 
I agree with Tymoczko that CAPs are not surveyable in the sense 
he requires, and if we accept (1), CAPs are not truly proofs. 
However, I think we have good reason to reject (1) as the criterion 
for a priori proofs: requiring that proofs be capable of generating a 
priori knowledge indexes what counts as ―proof‖ to particular, 
individual minds. On (1), whether a given argument is a proof 
depends on facts about the person attempting to understand it. 
 Because knowledge is a species of belief, it belongs to 
individuals. When Jones and Smith witness the same event, they 
form their own separate beliefs about it, which then count as 
knowledge if and only if they are true. So ―Jones‘ knowledge‖ and 
―Smith‘s knowledge‖ are distinct entities. Further, what is 
sufficient to provide Jones with ―knowledge of x‖ may not be 
sufficient to provide Smith with ―knowledge of x.‖ What actually 
will generate knowledge in a person depends on facts about that 
                                                 
5
 Tymoczko, The Four-Color Problem, 60. 
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person‘s perception and reasoning processes, and such 
contingencies are unacceptable for a good definition of proof.  
Imagine an argument that requires hundreds of billions of 
pages to write down on paper (for example, suppose we somehow 
printed the results from every computation performed during 
Appel‘s the proof of the 4CT). That argument would be 
unsurveyable in a very real way. The time required to read and 
absorb it would exceed the human lifespan several times over. By 
(1), the argument is not a proof. But suppose now that modern 
technology increases human life expectancy tenfold, and cognitive 
enhancements permit us to read quickly enough to digest the 
argument and know its contents. The same definition dictates that 
now, the argument is a proof. Its proof-status changed because of 
strictly empirical facts which had nothing to do with the argument 
itself! Suppose further that an environmental disaster destroys the 
technology, but leaves record of the argument intact. Has it now 
ceased being a proof? 
Mathematicians and philosophers often assert that ―false 
proof‖ is a contradiction in terms.6 Proofs are certain and timeless. 
If Euclid proved a proposition in 300 B.C., that same proof 
remains equally valid today. Definition (1) does not capture this 
character of mathematical proofs. We do not want our criteria for 
proof-hood to depend on any one person‘s a priori knowledge, 
because what is a priori knowable in practice will always be 
contingent. We need a different concept of ―a priori proof.‖ 
A better definition of ―a priori proof‖ will determine the 
argument‘s epistemic status using only features of the argument 
                                                 
6
 Rota, The Phenomenology of Mathematical Proof, 183. 
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itself—not features of the entities reading it. Remember, to call 
something a priori is to say that its ultimate justification does not 
depend on empirical propositions; whether any one person‘s 
knowledge of that justification is also a priori is irrelevant. Hence, 
I offer a counter-definition: 
 
(2) An argument is an ―a priori proof‖ if and only if: 
(a) none of its premises depend on empirical evidence for 
justification; and 
(b) the conclusion follows from the premises using only 
rules of inference with non-empirical justification. 
 
Unlike (1), (2) does not depend upon contingent facts unrelated to 
the argument itself. The argument will be a priori or not regardless 
of whom or what is reading it. Moreover, (2) best captures the 
spirit of a priori as a feature of justifications, rather than genesis. 
(1) seems dependent on the ―context of discovery‖—it asks, ―How, 
in practice, did some mathematician come to know the theorem in 
question?‖ (2) cares only about how we might, in principle, justify 
that theorem. If we can do so independently of sense experience, 
our theorem has achieved a priori status. On (2), ―a priori proofs‖ 
are arguments guaranteed to generate a priori justifications, which 
is precisely what proofs ought to do.  
 Given our assumption that ―normal‖ mathematical 
knowledge is a priori, we can derive the following: 
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(2*) An argument is an ―a priori proof‖ if:  
(a) all its premises are mathematical axioms or theorems; 
and 
(b) the conclusion follows from the premises using only 
rules of logic. 
 
Deciding whether computer-assisted proofs are legitimately a 
priori requires only determining whether they meet our two 
sufficient conditions. Do the computers assisting us employ only 
mathematically warranted inferences? We have excellent reason 
for believing they do.  
 
Do CAPs Meet Our Definition? 
 Consider Appel and Haken‘s proof of the 4CT, for example. 
Exactly what role did computers play? We should remember that 
one hundred percent of the conceptual work for the proof was 
developed by humans. Stated roughly,
7
 Appel and Hanken 
developed an algorithm—a mechanical procedure for applying a 
finite number of mathematical operations to some input, 
terminating in some output. The algorithm—like any valid 
algorithm—involves only mathematically warranted steps. The 
mathematicians proved, using tried-and-true human-generated 
methods, that when the algorithm takes a graph as input, a certain 
output results if and only if the graph has the property of being 
                                                 
7
 The description that follows oversimplifies a complicated and technical 
mathematical process, but I believe it accurately portrays the philosophical 
elements involved. 
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―reducible‖.8 They further proved that if every one of a particular 
set of graphs is reducible, the 4CT must necessarily be correct. No 
suspect ―computer-proof‖ has been invoked thus far.  
 Applying the algorithm by hand, however, is simply 
impracticable. The procedure requires ―analysis of about ten 
thousand neighborhoods of vertices‖ for each of about fifteen 
hundred graphs.
9
 Given the computational nature of an algorithm, 
the only reasonable way forward involves outsourcing these 
calculations to a machine. To do so, they wrote a machine-
language program—another series of mechanical instructions that, 
in theory, cause the machine to run through the algorithm precisely 
as Appel and Hanken described it, storing its data in bits of RAM. 
On the hypothesis that the computer functions properly, it executes 
the algorithm using only inferences with a priori justification.  
 Three things in this process are of note. First, the work 
done by computer in CAPs remains purely combinatorial—
different in scope, but not kind, from the role that calculators and 
even abaci serve in ―normal‖ mathematics. That role comes 
nowhere near the creative artificial intelligence Tymoczko 
imagines: 
 
Suppose that advances in computer science lead 
to the following circumstances. We can program 
a computer to initiate a search through various 
proof procedures, with subprograms to modify 
                                                 
8
 I will not discuss here what ―reducibility‖ means as a property of graphs. For 
details of the proof, see Appel and Hanken, 2002. 
9
 Appel, Kenneth and Wolfgang Haken. ―The Four Color Problem,‖ in 
Philosophy of Mathematics: An Anthology, ed. Dale Jacquette (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 207 
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and combine procedures in appropriate 
circumstances, until it finds a proof of statement 
A. After a long time, the computer reports a 
proof of A, although we can‘t reconstruct the 
general shape of the proof beyond the bare 
minimum…. [T]he question is whether 
mathematicians would have sufficient faith in 
the reliability of computers to accept this 
result.
10
 
 
The kind of method Tymoczko describes goes far beyond a 
computer-assisted proof—it represents a computer-generated 
proof. Specifically, Tymoczko hypothesizes a scenario in which a 
computer creates a ―proof‖ of Peano arithmetic‘s inconsistency. 
Surely, he says, logicians would find this result ―hard to swallow.‖ 
I agree; we should be very skeptical of such a hypothetical proof—
but that hesitation does not indicate that mathematicians lack 
confidence in the basic calculations computers perform. Again, 
CAPs require only this latter kind of combinatorial computation. 
 Second, we see that computers might introduce error into 
proof results in two ways: through flaws in their programming (a 
software bug), or malfunctions in the physical processes 
underlying their data storage systems (a hardware bug). Both are 
real possibilities, but neither differs substantially from the errors 
commonly found in flawed attempts at proof by humans. We 
misuse notation and make similar syntactical mistakes with 
regularity, and our calculations are exponentially more error-prone 
than those of machines. If I ask a mathematician for even a 
(relatively) simple combinatorial result—say, the rational 
                                                 
10
 Tymoczko, The Four-Color Problem, 74. 
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representation of 

32497
8237






234

587i13
7
i1
737
 , he will immediately 
reach for a calculator or (even more likely thirty years after 
Tymoczko published his paper) a computer. Why? Because 
empirically, computers are simply more reliable than humans. 
Appel, in his philosophical defense of his work, observes: 
 
When proofs are long and highly computational, 
it may be argued that even when hand checking 
is possible, the probability of human error is 
considerably higher than that of machine error; 
moreover, if the computations are sufficiently 
routine, the validity of programs themselves is 
easier to verify than the correctness of hand 
computations.
11
 
 
His last comment raises the final, most important point of how 
computer-derivations function in practice: they are subject to easy 
and repeated verification. Certainly, it is possible for a single 
processor or a single program to malfunction in some way and 
thereby produce a false result. But CAPs like that of the 4TC have 
been reproduced on hundreds of individual computers, and their 
results agreed upon by numerous independently-coded programs. 
In fact, new implementations for deriving the 4CT proof continue 
to appear even in the 21
st
 century. Granted, these results should not 
give us complete, absolute confidence in its validity (as 
philosophers, we regard very few things as certain beyond a 
doubt). But given the rigor and frequency of their verification, we 
can be just about as confident that Appel and Haken‘s algorithm 
                                                 
11
 Appel, The Four Color Problem, 207. 
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indeed generates the desired output as we can be about any 
empirical fact. 
 I say ―empirical‖ without concern, though Tymoczko and 
his sympathizers would balk at such an admission. They grant that 
computers are almost always reliable, but argue that when 
assessing their capacity to prove theorems, we are exclusively 
concerned with a priori evidence. Tymoczko says as much: 
 
[T]here is a great deal of accumulated evidence 
for the reliability of computers in [CAP] 
operations, and the work of the original 
computers was checked by other 
computers....The reliability of the 4CT, 
however, is not of the same degree as that 
guaranteed by traditional proofs, for this 
reliability rests on the assessment of a complex 
set of empirical factors.
12
 
 
In my estimation, this common argument misses the crucial 
distinction between the proof‘s a priori justification for its 
conclusion, and our knowledge of that justification. As per our 
definition, proof-hood requires that arguments begin from a priori 
premises, and proceed along a priori methods; our belief that it 
does so needn‘t be similarly a priori. We have overwhelming a 
posteriori evidence that the computer‘s methodology follows strict 
a priori guidelines, and therefore meets our criteria for an ―a priori 
proof.‖ 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Tymoczko, The Four-Color Problem, 74. 
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Conclusion 
 Tymoczko and I start from fundamentally different 
conceptions of what ―a priori‖ means in the context of 
mathematical results. He roots his entire project in the idea that 
that ―mathematical theorems are known a priori.‖13 Are they 
always? Remember that knowledge is proprietary to individuals. 
One person can have a priori knowledge of a fact another person 
knows only empirically, and this principle does not change when 
applied to mathematical knowledge. Much (dare I say, most) 
mathematical knowledge exists on an a posteriori basis. For 
example, I have no graduate training in mathematics, but when a 
Fields medalist informs me she has proven an extremely high-level 
theorem, I believe her. Is my belief justified? I say yes. This 
woman is likely the most knowledgeable expert on the planet. She 
has nothing to gain from lying, but everything to lose if caught. If I 
cannot trust her opinion, I can trust no one‘s. Is my belief true? If 
she really has proven the theorem, it must be. In such a case, my 
belief constitutes a posteriori knowledge of a mathematical 
theorem. I expect that most undergraduates accept their professors‘ 
word about theorems prima facie, and thereby create knowledge of 
a similar kind. Asserting that theorems are necessarily known a 
priori seems simply unrealistic.  
 We better capture the aprioricity of theorems with reference 
not to how particular individuals actually know them, but how 
those theorems are justified. For this, we must look to the proofs‘ 
methods. As per (2*), mathematical arguments follow a priori 
methods when neither their premises nor inferences depend upon 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., 60 
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sense experience for justification. This certainly seems to be the 
case for Appel and Haken‘s proof of the 4TC, and for other CAPs 
like it.  
 Tymoczko rightly asserts that mathematicians’ knowledge 
of CAPs is necessarily empirical. That fact is difficult to deny. 
However, it does not speak to the internal operations of the proof, 
which (in my estimation) are the sole determinants of the proof‘s a 
priori status. As long the proof offers an a priori justification for its 
conclusion, it does not matter whether humans know of that 
justification in an a priori way. In essence: we need not know a 
priori that the proof’s warrant is a priori. Insofar as we trust our 
belief that hundreds of tests run on hundreds of thousands of 
combinations of software and hardware platforms cannot all be 
completely mistaken, we should trust our belief that CAPs justify 
their conclusion without reliance on empirics. Anyone suggesting 
that CAPs are not sufficient ―proofs‖ for lack of a priori 
justification cannot ignore this result.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 198 
 
Bibliography 
 
Appel, Kenneth and Wolfgang Haken. ―The Four Color Problem,‖ 
in Philosophy of Mathematics: An Anthology, ed. Dale 
Jacquette (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002) 
 
Kripke, Saul A. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Rota, Gian Carlo. 1997. "The Phenomenology of Mathematical 
Proof". Synthese. 111 (2): 183-196. 
 
Tymoczko, Thomas. 1979. "The Four-Color Problem and Its 
Philosophical Significance". The Journal of Philosophy. 76 
(2): 57-83. 
 
 
  
